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The notion of similarity plays a central role in Quine's theory of Universals and it is with the help of this notion that Quine intends to define the concept of kind which also plays a central role in the theory. But as Quine has admitted, his attempts to define kinds in terms of similarities were unsuccessful and it is mainly because of this shortcoming that Quine's theory has been ignored by several philosophers (see, e.g., Armstrong, 1978a, p. 46). In the present paper, I propose an alternative framework that accounts for the phenomena that Quine intends to explain with his resemblance theory. The framework agrees with Quine's austere ontology; in particular, it does not assume the existence of properties and of possible worlds. Moreover, the framework is extensionalist since the abstract entities it assumes are classes and these can be individuated extensionally, for classes are identical if their members are identical. Finally, I will refute some of the objections to Quine's approach that have been raised by Armstrong and Oliver (1996) and I will argue that, contrary to what has been claimed by Oliver, Quine is able to specify an important set of sparse properties.

1. Properties and meanings
In his well known paper ‘On what there is’ (1953a), Quine gives a succinct account of his position on Universals:
The words ‘houses’, ‘roses’ and ‘sunsets’ are true of sundry individual entities which are houses and roses and sunsets, and the word ‘red’ or ‘red object’ is true of each sundry individual entities which are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; but there is not, in addition, any entity whatever, individual or otherwise, which is named by the word ‘redness’ nor, for that matter, by the word ‘househood’, ‘rosehood’, ‘sunsethood’. That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible (1953a, p. 10). 

Quine is arguing in this passage that although we can form linguistic expressions such as 'redness' and 'househood', there are no entities, usually called attributes or properties, which are named by the expressions. The reason is that since "we have no clue as to the circumstances under which attributes may be said to be the same or different" (Quine, 1969a, p. 19), attributes or properties have no clear principle of individuation; they are intensionalist entities. Therefore, the ontological status of properties is rather dubious. (I use 'properties' for both attributes and properties.) Moreover, since we can replace sentences that mention properties by paraphrases that only assume entities that do have clear principles of individuation, there is no need to assume the existence of properties. Therefore, considerations of parsimony – the scientist's "taste for desert landscapes" (Quine, 1953a, p. 4) -- suggest doing science without assuming the existence of such "twilight half-entities" (Quine, 1969a, p. 23). To be sure, Quine does accept the existence of abstract classes since they are needed for formulating "a modern scientific system of the world" (Quine, 1980, p. 450). But classes have a clear principle of individuation because "classes are identical when they have the same members" (Quine, 1953b, p. 107). Therefore, Quine accepts classes while rejecting properties. Notice however that since classes are usually treated as Universals, Quine's position is not a strict nominalistic one and he explicitly admits this when stating that he is "a deep-dyed realist of abstract universals" (1980, p. 451).
	Quine thus rejects the existence of properties and he is not impressed by the fact that we can form expressions such as 'redness' or 'househood'. Linguistic usages do not decide ontological issues since we can replace the intensionalist sentences by extensionalist paraphrases. However, Quine does consider the argument that predicates such as 'red' have meanings and since meanings are supposed to be properties, it would follow that we must assume the existence of properties in order to account for the meanings of predicates. Quine's reply to this argument is that he refuses to admit meanings. To be sure, he does agree that linguistic utterances may be meaningful (for a person or for a verbal community). But this is an empirical phenomenon that should be treated scientifically and he proposes to analyze it in terms "directly of what people do in the presence of the linguistic utterance in question and other utterances similar to it" (1953a, p. 11). Quine also agrees that expressions can be synonymous and again he proposes to analyze the phenomenon which "is as difficult as it is important" in terms of behavior (1953a, p. 12). 
 	In his later publication, Word and Object, Quine (1960) expands considerably on his proposal to analyze the linguistic phenomena of significance and synonymy and he deals extensively with verbal behavior; in particular, with the ostensive learning processes by which children learn their first linguistic expressions -- the learning processes that transform strings of sounds into meaningful expressions. Quine investigates many aspects of these processes but I will deal here mainly with the role that is played in the processes by similarity. Quine points out that in order to account for ostensive learning we must attribute to children a prelinguistic quality space: 
[The child] must have a prior tendency to weight qualitative differences unequally. He must, so to speak, sense more resemblance between some stimulations than between others. Otherwise, a dozen reinforcements of his response 'Red', on occasions where red things were present, would no more encourage the same response to a thirteenth red thing than to a blue one" (1960, p. 83). 

A child must thus have a prelinguistic quality space -- he must sense more resemblance between some stimulations than between others -- in order to learn to apply ostensive words to specific entities and we can "estimate the relative distances in his quality space by observing how he learns" (p. 83); in particular, by experiments on conditioning and extinction. 
In his later article 'Natural kinds' (1969b), Quine investigates more closely the nature of quality spaces, which he now calls 'standards of similarity'. The investigation is in the context of the role of similarity in induction and it also covers the ostensive learning of words since this learning process is a particular instance of inductive learning. But now Quine faces a serious problem. Quine thinks that in order to account for our inductive inferences we need the notion of kind, because we have to distinguish between inductive inferences about classes such as 'Raven', which are supposed to be kinds, and inductive inferences about classes such as 'Non-raven', which are not. But how are we going to define the notion of kind? Quine proposes to characterize it in terms of similarities because the "notion of kind and the notion of similarity seem to be variants or adaptations of a single notion" (1969b, p. 117). But this approach shows to be unsuccessful. The similarity notion that we obtain with the help of experiments on conditioning and extinction is the comparative notion of a being more similar to b than to c (for subject s) and it seems to be impossible to define a notion of kind by using this comparative notion. Quine examines various options for solving the problem such as appealing to paradigms (p. 119) or to respects (p. 122), but none is satisfactory. He concludes with the pessimistic conclusion that a “definition of kinds in terms of similarity is unknown” (1969b, p. 121). This conclusion is duly noted by Armstrong (1978a, p. 46) and is probably the reason why Armstrong does not seriously consider Quine's views on Universals, including on issues that are not directly affected by the similarity problem. 
The failure of explaining inductive inferences and ostensive learning processes with the help of a comparative notion of similarity can be illustrated by considering a child who has been reinforced for saying 'dog' in the presence of a poodle. There is no doubt that conditioning experiments will show that the original dog, the poodle, is more similar to other poodles than to most other dogs, more similar to other dogs than to giraffes, more similar to giraffes than to clouds, etc. So the question arises: which are the stimuli that will, in Quine's words, 'encourage the same response?' That is, which is the class, the kind, that contains the stimuli that will elicit the word 'dog' from the child? In still other terms, which is the extension that the word 'dog' has acquired for the child? Clearly, comparative similarity cannot answer these questions.
But this failure does not mean the end of Quine's program. There exists an extensionalist framework that is able to account for the meaningfulness of linguistic utterances and this framework only assumes Quine's austere ontology; in particular, it does not assume the existence of properties and possible worlds. This framework, which I will call the generalization framework (GF), only assumes the learning mechanisms that are acknowledged by Quine and we will see that it accounts for our elementary inductive inferences as well as for the ostensive learning of new words, the learning process that converts strings of sounds into meaningful expressions for a person. 
	Lately, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002) has proposed a novel method for defending Nominalistic positions on Universals. But since this method assumes the existence of possible worlds, and since possible worlds have no clear principle of individuation, the resulting theory exceeds Quine's ontology. Just recall Quine's ironic example of the possible fat man in the doorway and the possible bald man in the doorway and the absence of a criterion of individuation that would decide whether they are "the same possible man, or two possible men" (1953a, p. 4). Therefore, the ontological status of possible worlds is at least as dubious as that of properties and there is no advantage in eliminating talk of properties by talk of possible worlds. Neither properties nor possible worlds can be individuated by extensionalist methods.1


2. The generalization framework GF
The generalization framework is mainly based on the so-called stimulus-generalization phenomenon. The following experiment performed by Baege enables us to introduce the framework: 
A lighted cigarette was held near the noses of young puppies. They sniffed at it once, turned tail, and nothing would induce them to come back to the source of the smell... A few days later, they reacted to the mere sight of a cigarette or even of a rolled piece of white paper, by bounding away and sneezing (Baege, 1933, p. 18).

The experiment, which is quoted by Popper (1963, p. 44), shows the puppies' generalization from the original cigarette to other objects, the objects that afterwards elicited the avoidance behavior. I will use 'W' for referring to the class that contains these objects and, speaking anthropomorphically, we can express the outcome of the experiment as the acquisition by the puppies of the expectation (or the hypothesis) 'All W have an unpleasant smell'. Classes such as W will be called generalization classes, relative to an original stimulus S, for subject s.
Baege's experiment shows several features of generalizing behavior. First, it shows that the puppies’ generalization was specific. Although the original cigarette was an element of an indefinite number of classes, such as of the class of non-ravens or non-emeralds, the puppies learned to avoid only the elements of class W. In other words, the disposition that induced the puppies to generalize from the original entity was biased; the generalization agreed with class W rather than with other classes. 
Second, the type of generalization performed by the puppies had a high degree of uniformity; the puppies' generalization classes were very similar. To be sure, there probably were individual differences between the generalization classes of the different puppies. But Baege’s report suggests that the classes had a large intersection, the intersection I describe with ‘W’. Notice, however, that experiments on stimulus generalization suggest that for the uniformity to occur, the subjects must be relatively naive with respect to the particular generalization (see, e.g., Catania, 1998; Walker, 1987). 
Third, it is likely that the puppies’ generalization classes had vague boundary regions, the regions that contained the objects that elicited increasingly weaker avoidance reactions. For the sake of simplicity, however, I will assume that the boundary region of a generalization class is divided in two sections, and only the elements of the inner section are supposed to be included in the class. (I will return later to this simplifying device.)
Fourth, as is already implied in the above definition, a generalization class is relative to an original stimulus. A change in the physical nature of the observed stimulus, e.g., a smaller cigarette, may determine a different generalization class. Nevertheless, I will sometimes ignore this relative aspect of generalization classes.
Let me come back to the second feature: the high degree of uniformity of the generalizations performed by the puppies. This uniformity suggests that the generalization bias, which determined that the puppies’ generalization class from the original cigarette was W rather than any other class, was strongly determined by innate factors, by the specific nature of the puppies’ innate generalizing dispositions. Because of this specific nature, Baege’s puppies generalized according to W. I will call the generalization classes that derive from a subject’s innate generalizing dispositions, innate generalization classes relative to the original entities, for the subject. (Quine speaks in this connection of innate standards of (perceptual) similarity, 1969b, p. 123; 1974, p. 19.) 
Restricting ourselves for the moment to humans, not every inductively acquired expectation agrees with a person's innate generalization classes. For example, experiments on discrimination show that the observation of negative instances of a previously acquired expectation will often induce the person to restrict the falsified expectation. More specifically, if a person observes a negative instance of the expectation 'All F are G', which she previously acquired upon observing an F that is G, and if the person notices a discriminative feature D that was present in the previously observed positive instance but is absent from the negative instance, then the person will frequently "replace" the original expectation by the restricted expectation 'All FD are G' where FD contains those elements of F that also have feature D (see, e.g., Catania, 1998, pp. 128-147; Walker, 1987, pp. 252-301; see also Stemmer, 1979, 1983, pp. 66-68). Classes such as FD will be called restricted generalization classes (relative to falsified generalizations). For example, suppose that a child has been exposed to an ostensive experience in which she hears an utterance of 'dog' while she is watching a dog, but her generalization class G from this dog is too wide. That is, she acquires the expectation that all G are called 'dog' and G also includes, say, giraffes. Now, suppose that when she afterwards applies the term 'dog' to giraffes, she is negatively reinforced -- she is told 'This is not a dog'. If the child remembers that the original dog had a feature F that is absent in giraffes (e.g., a short neck), then the falsifying experience may induce her to restrict the previously acquired expectation. She will now believe that only the elements of G that also have feature F are called 'dog'. (The restriction of expectations upon observing falsifying events plays a crucial role in induction. It enables people to increase the objective reliability of their inductive inferences, see, Stemmer, 1979, 1983, pp. 66-70. Moreover, although I have used the notion of feature when characterizing restricted expectations, this notion can be eliminated by using the machinery discussed in Stemmer, 1983, pp. 87-94.) 
Organisms can also learn to generalize according to classes that are wider than innate generalization classes, provided they undergo appropriate experiences (see, e.g., Quine, 1974, p. 20). For example, assuming that classes such as dogs, whales, and bats are innate generalization classes or close to such classes (relative to "typical" entities), then the class of mammals, which is the union of classes such as dogs, whales, and bats, would be an expanded generalization class, for the persons who underwent the appropriate experiences. (The child's learning of words such as 'toy' or 'furniture' is based on generalizations according to such expanded generalization classes.)
Our conclusions so far enable us to introduce a context dependent notion of sufficient similarity. If on a particular occasion, G is the generalization class (innate, restricted, expanded or a combination of these) with respect to entity e for subject s, then I will say that on this occasion, the elements of G are sufficiently similar to e for s to be included in a generalization class. For example, for Baege's puppies, the rolled pieces of white paper which were among the elements of class W were sufficiently similar to the original cigarette to be included in their generalization class. When using this notion, I will sometimes eliminate the clause 'to be included in a generalization class'. In these cases, I will speak of sufficient similarity simpliciter. 
We notice that the notion 'sufficiently similar' is highly context dependent because the context is supposed to indicate which the relevant generalization class is. I introduce this notion because it seems to correspond closely to our colloquial, non-comparative notion of similarity as when we say that Fido is similar to Jerry. The notion also enables us to replace the notion 'similar with respect to property P' (cf. Armstrong, 1978a, p. 45) by 'sufficiently similar with respect to the generalization class C'. We notice that both notions are context dependent because it is the context that suggests which the property P is and which the generalization class C is. But the advantage of the latter notion is that it appeals to classes which in contrast to properties have a clear principle of individuation.

3. Classes with vague boundaries
I introduced above the simplifying device of dividing the boundary region of a generalization class in two sections and to include the elements of the inner section in the class itself. This device is not an innocent device, however, since it ignores the gradual character of an organism's generalizations, the character which is expressed by the so-called generalization gradients that reflect the results of a series of stimulus-generalization experiments. And it is this feature that gives the similarity notion, which Quine and other scholars have derived from such generalizations, its comparative character.
Although generalizations have usually a gradual character, the simplifying device which ignores this character is almost universally adopted in at least two fields: in the treatment of inductive inferences and of verbal behavior. Consider the famous example of the inductive inference of 'All ravens are black' from the observation of a black raven. Although we admit that when a person inductively infers this hypothesis from the observation of a black raven, her generalization class has vague boundaries, we normally use the word 'raven' which refers to a definite class in order to refer to the vague generalization class. And this practice does not prevent smooth communication between speakers of natural languages. A similar approach we adopt in the case of verbal behavior. We normally talk as if the extension of an ostensive word, e.g., of 'dog', is a definite class (for a normal speaker of English). Nevertheless, we do admit that this extension has actually vague boundaries. (We notice that the tacit decision of ignoring vague boundaries also holds for those who speak of meanings. They, too, admit that the meaning of 'dog' for a normal speaker of English has vague boundaries.)
The vague boundaries of generalization classes do not prevent us from applying to them the principle of individuation according to which classes are identical if their members are identical. We can either apply the principle separately to the core members and then to the boundary members or we can adopt the method of dividing the vague boundaries in two and add the inner region to the core class. Quine (1975a) develops a related individuation method when discussing the vague boundaries of physical objects such as desks: 
What the vagueness of boundaries [of physical objects] amounts to is this: there are many almost identical physical objects almost coextensive with one another, and differing only in the inclusion or exclusion of various peripheral molecules. Any of these almost coextensive objects could serve as the desk, and no one the wiser; such is the vagueness of desks. Nevertheless, they all have their impeccable principle of individuation; physical objects are identical if and only if coextensive (p. 3).

If we replace here the expressions 'physical objects' and 'desks' by the term 'classes' and the expression 'peripheral molecules' by 'peripheral members' then Quine's analysis also holds for the individuation of classes with vague boundaries.
There is further linguistic phenomenon that is usually ignored. We speak of the extension of a word w, say, of the English word 'dog'. But we admit that often there are large differences between different speakers of English with respect to the extension of 'dog' (or with respect to the meaning of 'dog', for those who speak of meanings). The main reasons are: Differences in the examples that were observed by the persons when they ostensively learned the word, differences in the speakers' innate and modified generalizing dispositions, and differences in the "shaping" experiences (such as negative feedback) that different people undergo. On the other hand, there are two main factors that favor standardization. The first is the above mentioned uniformity of our innate generalizing bias; it directs the initial generalizations of the speakers towards a common denominator. As Quine expresses it in terms of similarity: 
[ostensive learning] is a curiously comfortable case of induction … the learner [of 'yellow'] is generalizing on his yellow samples by similarity considerations, and his neighbors have themselves acquired the use of the word 'yellow', in their day, by the same similarity considerations. The learner of 'yellow' is thus making his induction in a friendly world (1969b, p. 125). 

The second factor is, somewhat paradoxically, the shaping experiences that are provided by the verbal community, such as negative feedback in case of mistakes. These experiences tend to favor uniformity in verbal behavior. 

4. Applications of GF
I will now examine a number of examples that show how our generalization framework GF accounts for the phenomena that have induced certain scholars to assume the reality of Universals. I will take the examples mainly from Armstrong (1978a) which contains several arguments that have been raised against Nominalists and directly and indirectly against some of Quine's views. Most of these examples are also discussed in Oliver (1996).  I begin with the claim which, Armstrong thinks, is not in dispute between Nominalists and Realists: "The piece of paper before me is a particular. It is white, so it has a property" (1978a, p. 11). This argument is supposed to show that there are properties. (Armstrong later weakens this claim, but I deal with it because it enables me to point to important features of GF.) Now, how does GF deal with this problem? GF, and Quine would probably agree, derives a different conclusion from the premise 'This piece of paper is white'. The conclusion of GF: 'This piece of paper is an element of a particular class C'. (Quine might say that the piece of paper is an element of a particular kind K.) And if more details of the class are requested, then, oversimplifying Quine's highly detailed analysis (see, e.g., Quine, 1974, pp. 24-27, 37-45), we can add that class C contains those objects that reflect light of a particular wavelength (to be determined by physics) and if a person is present then, under favorable circumstances, the reflected light will impinge on the person's nerve endings producing certain neural effects (to be determined by neurological science). And if the person is a member of an English speaking community, the impinging may activate the neural traces left when the person ostensively learned to apply the word 'white' to the elements of a generalization class G. This activation may then elicit an utterance of 'white' if, for example, the person is asked 'What is the color of this piece of paper?' and the piece of paper is indeed an element of the generalization class G. (For a detailed discussion of the neural traces left by ostensive learning and of their activation by certain stimuli, see Quine, 1974, pp. 24-27.) 
The answer to the question of how "to account for the apparent (if usually partial) identity of numerically different particulars" (Armstrong, 1978a, p. 12) follows the same line. Two different pieces of paper may belong to one generalization class: the class whose members may elicit utterances of 'white' from speakers of English. 
  Armstrong also mentions Locke's observation that, "Since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms…?" (1690, Bk. III, ch. 3, § 6). Again, our analysis of the ostensive learning of words explains the phenomenon. Since children process ostensive experiences with the help of their generalizing dispositions, they become able to apply a particular word w to all the elements of the generalization class G that is generated by the original ostensive example. For instance, hearing the request 'Show me a w' will, under favorable circumstances, elicit the response of pointing to an element of G. Here, w is a general term and G is its extension.
In a comment on Armstrong (1978a) regarding Quine's position on Universals, Devitt (1980) states that "it is part of a good [Quinean] explanation of the link between 'tiger' and the many objects that it applies to that those objects are genetically of a certain sort" (p. 436). This is indeed correct and it matches the above characterization of the objects that reflect light of a particular wavelength. But Quine's account of ostensive learning processes gives us many more details of the processes by which such links are established; in particular, it points to the experiences and the learning mechanisms that establish the link -- the neural trace -- which gives a person the capacity to apply the word 'tiger' to those objects that are similar to the ostensive example, that belong to the same kind. In the terminology of GF, the neural trace gives the person the capacity to apply the word 'tiger' to the objects that belong to the elements of the relevant generalization class T, where T is either the innate generalization class relative to the observed examples or it has been replaced by a different class because of certain shaping experiences. 
Commenting on Devitt's analysis, Armstrong notes that although Quine's account, as stated by Devitt, critically depends on the notion of applies, the "semantics of 'applies' has been left totally obscure" (1980, p. 445) and Armstrong suggests that a convincing account of the semantics of this expression cannot be given without appeal to properties. But we have just seen that Quine accounts for the semantics of 'applies' by acknowledging the role of a person's experiences and of her learning mechanisms in establishing links between ostensively learned expressions and certain entities and Quine's account does not appeal to properties. To be sure, the account appeals to kinds and similarities and this may justify Armstrong's misgivings because Quine himself admits that there are problems with these two notions. But we have seen that this can be remedied, for the generalization framework GF avoids the problems by replacing the notions of kind and similarity by the notion of generalization class. And since GF makes no use of properties, this framework, which accounts for the links between ostensive expressions and classes of entities, stays within the boundaries of Quine's extensionalist ontology. (Note, however, that ostensive learning processes only give us a series of sufficient conditions for the semantics of 'applies'. But Quine's extensive discussion of other learning processes, especially in his (1960) and (1974) books, allows us to tighten the semantics of this empirical notion.)
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2000) mentions the case where a single entity e has different properties P and Q, e.g., white and spherical, and he calls this the problem of the Many over One. In GF, this case corresponds to an entity that is an element of different generalization classes. Clearly, such cases do not require the introduction of properties. To be sure, the generalization classes can have a different status, e.g., one may be an innate generalization class (say, the class of dogs) and the other an expanded class (say, the class of black objects). But again there is no need to introduce the notion of properties in order to account for differences in status. The differences derive from relevant differences in the person's experiences, the experiences that generated the generalization classes.
	Armstrong also discusses the type/token distinction and he thinks that Nominalists, and perhaps even Quine, refuse "to give any account of type/token distinction, and, in particular, any account of types" (1978a, pp. 16-17). But it is easy to see that GF has no problem in accounting for the distinction. The child who hears an utterance of 'dog' while looking at a dog has been exposed to a token of the word 'dog'. But she will be able to respond correctly to further utterances of the type 'dog' provided these utterances are sufficiently similar to the original token – that is, provided her generalizing dispositions induce her to include the further utterances in the generalization class G that is generated by the original token. G is the type and the original token as well as further tokens, heard or spoken, are elements of G.
	As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, Quine suggests accounting for synonymy by examining relevant verbal behavior. Ostensive learning processes provide us with an elementary notion of synonymy. Suppose a child has grown up in a bi-lingual environment and has ostensively learned the word 'dog' as well as the Spanish word 'perro' by observing the same dog. This child will probably apply both the word 'dog' as well as the Spanish word 'perro' to the same extension E. This would be an elementary case of synonymy because the physical similarity between the learning events, namely, observing the same dog in the ostensive experiences, suggests that the neurological effects of the events -- the traces – are sufficiently similar to, (1) generate the identical extension E, (2) account for the child's "mental intuitions" regarding the sameness of meaning of the two words; more exactly, the activation of the traces by certain stimulations (verbal or contextual) may elicit from the child metalinguistic statements asserting such sameness of meaning. 
To be sure, I am assuming here that Armstrong as well as most monist philosophers agrees that our mental intuitions of synonymy are caused by physical factors; in the present case, by neural (or neurophysiological) factors. And I am also assuming that the relatively uniform mental intuitions regarding synonymy among members of a verbal community (as manifested by relevant, mainly verbal, behavior) derives from the sufficient physical similarity between, (1) the neural traces left when the members learned the synonymous expressions, (2) the neural traces left by the experiences in which people learn metalinguistic expressions such as 'have the same meaning'. These assumptions are of course just inferences to the best materialistic explanation of our semantic intuitions and of their verbal manifestations regarding meanings and synonymy and they agree with Quine's conclusions on the neural effects of the learning of words (see, e.g., Quine, 1974, pp. 24-27, 1975b; see also Stemmer, 2001, on the learning of mental terms).
	But the identity, or close similarity, of the extensions of two expressions is not sufficient for ensuring the mental synonymy of the expressions as is shown, for example, by the pair 'human' and 'featherless-biped'. Although these expressions have the same extension, our intuitions, as manifested by relevant, mainly verbal, behavior, tell us that they don't have the same meaning (see, e.g., Armstrong, 1978a, p. 7). The reason suggested by GF is that the learning processes of the expressions are usually radically different. Therefore, the neural effects of these processes are sufficiently different to elicit statements negating their synonymy.
	Armstrong discusses at length the relation between properties and classes and he mentions several problems that arise in this connection. For example, we may need a criterion for distinguishing between natural and non-natural classes since some scholars think that only the former determine properties (cf. Armstrong, 1978a, pp. 38-41). But this is a problem only for those who admit the existence of properties. They must decide, for example, whether the class of grue objects determines a property, say, the property Grueness and whether the property Grueness indeed exists. (The word ‘grue’ is defined as ‘green and the time is before the year 3000 A.D., or blue and the time is after this year’.) But this does not affect GF. According to this framework, the class containing green as well as the class containing grue objects are legitimate classes. To be sure, the former is probably an innate generalization class for normal persons or close to one (relative to typical entities) while the latter is not. But the fact that some classes are innate generalization classes while others are not does not compel GF to introduce properties. 
A further question that can be asked is whether a particular class is appropriate for being used in inductive inferences – whether it carves reality at the joints, whether it is projectible (see, e.g., Goodman, 1965). I will discuss this issue below when dealing with so-called sparse properties.
	Armstrong also analyzes extensively the problems that affect resemblance theories of Universals and he mentions issues such as the need for paradigms and the problems that derive from the gradual character of resemblance. However, as I have tried to show in this paper, these problems are avoided by GF which is based on generalization classes rather than on similarities. But there is one aspect that merits a separate comment. Armstrong discusses the similarity relation between a red pen, a blue pen and a marigold and he concludes that the red pen is more similar to the blue pen than to the marigold, in spite of the fact that the first and the last have the same color (1978a, p. 59). But suppose we now raise the question, how would we confirm Armstrong's plausible conclusion? It is very likely that most scientifically oriented philosophers will suggest a generalization test in which we might examine whether a normal person generalizes more easily from a red pen to a blue pen than to a marigold. If this shows to be indeed the case, then we would have confirmed Armstrong's conclusion. (There probably are different methods for setting up the relevant generalization experiments. For example, we might check whether both the red pen and the blue pen belong to an innate generalization class for a person or whether the person must first realize, via experiences such as those described by Quine (1974, p. 20), that these objects share a particular function, and only afterwards she will generalize from the red pen to the blue pen.) 
An interesting point is revealed here. The likelihood that most scientifically oriented philosophers will propose a generalization test for confirming Armstrong's conclusion suggests that they actually agree that the basic behavioral phenomenon that stands behind our similarity intuitions is generalizing behavior. Now, on the basis of this behavior, Quine and many others then define the notion of similarity. But we have seen that a relatively exact notion of similarity is basically comparative and it is impossible to define a class notion, such as the notion of kind or the notion of the extension of a word, on the basis of a comparative similarity notion. All these complications are avoided by the generalization framework GF. It begins with the notion of generalizing behavior and it stays with this notion. It does not introduce in addition the notion of similarity, at least not in those cases where we deal with elementary inductive inferences and ostensive learning processes. To be sure, the notion of similarity is so familiar to us that it seems extremely difficult to do without it. But in these cases, it is very likely that the implicitly assumed notion is the non-comparative notion of similarity with respect to a property. But once we try to clarify this notion, then GF gives the most plausible and most parsimonious account of the phenomenon. Consider, for example, the statement that a is similar to b with respect to poodleness. According to GF, what this statement actually says is that a and b are poodles, i.e., belong to the class of poodles, and we may add that the class of poodles is a generalization class for many people corresponding, among others, to the extension of the English word 'poodle'. (See also the above discussion of the notion of sufficient similarity.) Admittedly, the class of poodles has vague boundaries. But this vagueness is matched by the vague boundaries of the property poodleness. However, and this is crucial, whereas we have a clear principle of individuation for the class of poodles, we are lacking this for the property poodleness. 

5. Oliver's arguments
I mentioned at the beginning of this paper that Quine proposes to replace expressions that seem to commit us to the existence of properties by paraphrases that only commit us to extensionalist entities. But in a paper on properties, Oliver (1996) examines various intensionalist expressions which he thinks cannot be rephrased in extensionalist language. I will come back to this claim later; first, I will discuss a more general argument that Oliver raises against Quine's approach.  Oliver argues that "those who think paraphrases are available for their purpose, produce one or two examples and think that they will do, no argument being given why one should think that a paraphrase is available in all cases" (p. 65). Now, first, Quine does give a wealth of examples especially in his (1974) book. But what is important is that Quine has a reason for thinking that a paraphrase is available in all cases or at least in most cases. The reason derives from the observational character of language acquisition:
Each of us learns his language by observing other people's verbal behavior and having his own faltering verbal behavior observed and reinforced or corrected by them. We depend strictly on overt behavior in observable situations (Quine, 1992, p. 38). 

These observable situations we then process with the help of our generalizing dispositions -- with the help of our innate standards of similarity. And the outcome of these processes is our capacity to apply the relevant words to the elements of certain generalizations classes and, especially if the words are Nouns, to certain extensions. Therefore, the availability of extensionalist paraphrases is supported by the observational nature of the process by which we learn our language. 
On the other hand, it is not clear how intensionalists intend to deal with the observational character of language acquisition. Suppose a child is ostensively learning the word 'human' by hearing this expression while she is paying attention to her mother. As a consequence, and according to intensionalists, the child will then apply the word to those entities that share with the mother the property of being human. This implies that the child will recognize the property in the original person and then, with the help of some kind of generalization capacity, she will be able to apply the word to further entities that have this property. But whereas we have an experimentally supported theory that accounts for the generalization from the observable features of the original person to other objects, namely the generalization framework GF, it is not clear whether there is an experimentally supported theory that accounts for generalizations such as those based on the property human (or featherless-bipedness, if the word she heard in the ostensive experiences was 'featherless-biped' rather than 'human'). Moreover, whereas the gradual character of stimulus generalization accounts for the vague boundaries of the extension of ostensively learned words, it is not clear whether there are experiments that account for the vague boundaries in intensionalist theories of language acquisition.
Now, intensionalists may be able to find experimental evidence for a property-based account of ostensive learning,2  and this account may perhaps cover even inductive generalizations in general including perhaps the generalization of Baege's puppies who may have based it on the property white-cigaretteness. But since we already have a plausible theory that gives an extensionalist account of ostensive learning, there is no need to turn to intensionalist accounts. It is therefore reasonable to assume that we can indeed find extensionalist paraphrases of expressions, at least of those that belong to the ostensive part of our language. 
Non-ostensive learning is a more difficult issue. But there is no doubt that whatever we learn about a non-ostensive expression derives exclusively from the "meanings" we have learned to associate with the verbal context in which the learning takes place, i.e., from the activation of the neural traces that were left when the terms of the verbal context were learned. (I ignore here mixed learning processes where the newly learned "meaning" is determined by both the verbal context and stimuli in the environment.) Now, whether the activation of the traces transfers the extensionalist character of the basic ostensive terms to the non-ostensive expressions with which they are directly or indirectly connected is difficult to determine.3 There is therefore no wholesale assumption that there are extensionalist paraphrases for all non-ostensive expressions.  And Quine indeed discusses several individual cases and he makes use of sophisticated logical devices, such as Frege's ancestor technique for defining natural numbers (Quine, 1951, pp. 229-236), in order to give an extensionalist account of these cases (see also below the discussion regarding the word 'color'). But what is critical is that non-ostensive learning, too, involve generalizations, generalizations from the individual examples to which the child is exposed. These features of the language acquisition process therefore support the conclusion that extensionalist paraphrases can be found. On the other hand, intensionalists must either assume that even ostensive learning processes are derived from generalizations based on properties or they must assume that, at some specified or unspecified stage, language learning goes from stimulus generalization into property-based learning processes. 
Oliver mentions other problems that are faced by Quine, but I will only discuss two of them. (Most of the others have been examined above in connection with Armstrong's observations.) Oliver thinks that Quine cannot give a paraphrase of 'Red is a color', because this sentence implies 'There is an x that is a color', and the quantifier would have to range over sets (1996, p. 65). However, Quine actually devotes almost six pages of his (1974) book to analyze this issue (pp. 70-75) and he tries to reconstruct the circumstances in which the word 'color' is learned. (For some strange reason, Oliver does not mention Quine's (1974) book when discussing his position.) I will not enter into the details of Quine's analysis. Let me only remark that Quine distinguishes three different contexts in which the word is learned. One occurs when the child ostensively learns expressions such as 'orange-colored' and 'coffee-colored', the second when she learns the eternal sentence 'α is a color' which can occur after the child has learned to distinguish color words from others, and the third is the learning of the observation sentence 'This is the same color (=tint) as this'. Each of the learning processes, which are based on generalizations from observed events, suggests appropriate extensionalist paraphrases. To be sure, some of the generalizations derive from very subtle clues, including meta-linguistic clues, as when the child uses the difference between color words and other words. Still, what is critical is that the clues are observable and they serve as basis for extensionalist generalizations. (Actually, most generalizations will be based on modified similarity standards, the standards that also allow us to learn, among others, words such as 'toy' and 'furniture'.)
I mentioned earlier that Quine tries to avoid modal notions since they have no clear individuation principle. Oliver argues that Quine needs modal notions in order to account for issues such as disposition, cause and law (1996, p. 45). But again in his (1974) book, Quine extensively discusses these issues (pp. 4-15) and he convincingly argues that one can give an extensionalist account of them. (See also, Quine, 1992, pp. 73-76, and the conclusions in the next section on objective projectibility.)  
Quine also deals with other sophisticated issues, such as the learning of shape words, relative clauses, quantifiers, or expressions that refer to second and higher-order classes. But I will not repeat Quine's conclusions. The reader is directed to Quine's publications, especially to his (1960) and (1974) books.   

6. Sparse Properties
Although we can talk of properties such as househood, grueness, and non-emeraldness, intensionalists realize that most of them are not interesting. As Lewis says: "Properties carve reality at the joints – and everywhere else as well" (1983, p. 346). Intensionalists therefore look for a criterion that distinguishes between natural or sparse properties – the interesting ones -- and the abundant properties. They have proposed different types of criteria. Armstrong, for example, thinks that "what [natural] properties and relations there are in the world is to be decided by total science, that is, by the sum total of all enquiries into the nature of things” (1978b, p. 8), while Lewis thinks that the sparse properties are "intrinsic" and "highly specific" and they "characterize things completely and without redundancy" (1986, p. 60). Lewis also thinks that it would probably best to say that "the distinction between natural properties and others admits of degree. Some few properties are perfectly natural" (1986, p. 61). Several other criteria have been proposed, for example by Sider (1995) and Swoyer (1996). But not only are the proposed criteria rather arbitrary; they are also quite vague. For example, it is difficult to decide on the basis of some of the criteria whether the properties determined by the extensions of terms such as 'dog', 'mammal', 'featherless biped', or 'phlogiston' are natural properties or not. (See also the discussions regarding the notion of 'intrinsic' in, e.g., Lewis, 2001, and Weatherson, 2001.) 
On the other hand, GF enables us to give a clear specification of a set of properties that are objectively important, that indeed carve nature at its joints. We have seen above that GF makes it possible to specify a set of classes that are strongly determined by our psychological generalizing dispositions, that are subjectively projectible (cf. Goodman, 1965).  They include our innate generalization classes and, to a lesser extent, the above mentioned restricted and expanded generalization classes. On the other hand, there are classes that have no or only a very remote relation to our generalizing dispositions such as the class of non-emeralds or of hydrogen atoms. Now, evolutionary theory suggests that innate dispositions had usually survival value; they helped us in our dealings with the objective world. If we apply this conclusion to our innate generalization classes, the classes that derive from our innate generalizing dispositions, we can conclude that the use of these classes in our inductive generalizations has often been highly useful; they often enabled us to arrive at expectations that were frequently successful in the objective world (see, e.g., Quine, 1969b, 1996; Quine and Ullian, 1970; Stemmer, 1971, 1979, 2004). As Quine says: "If people’s innate spacing of qualities is a gene-linked trait, then the spacing that has made for the most successful inductions will have tended to predominate through natural selection" (1969b, p. 126).  In other words, and speaking very roughly, innate generalization classes are not only subjectively projectible but they often also had a high degree of objective projectibility. Consequently, and again with many reservations, innate generalization classes allow us to define similarities that are objective since they indeed carve nature at its joints. Therefore, and if we want to introduce the notion of property, our conclusions allow us to specify an initial set of natural or sparse properties on the basis of our innate generalization classes.4 To be sure, there are many more classes that have shown to carve nature at the joints and even in a better way. In Quine's words: "[Man] has risen above [innate similarity standards] by developing modified systems of kinds, hence modified similarity standards for scientific purposes" (1969b, p. 128). Therefore, the present conclusions about the objective projectibility of our innate generalization classes only allow us to specify an initial set of sparse properties. Still, this result is important because the specification has two features which distinguish it from the specifications suggested by the above mentioned criteria: (1) it is motivated by a widely accepted scientific theory, namely by evolutionary theory which suggests that the properties often reflected objective features of nature; (2) it is based on well defined experiments, the experiments on stimulus generalization. 
In a discussion of Lewis' view on natural properties, Oliver claims that Quine's innate quality spaces, which generate our subjective similarity standards, cannot help us to specify natural properties because these properties are supposed to reflect objective features of nature: "A property is not made natural by.... our innate quality spacing. [Since] there are objective similarities in nature, so the natural properties which make for such similarities are objective" (Oliver, 1996, p. 40). But Oliver's claim is incorrect. To be sure, the similarity standards that are determined by Quine's innate quality spaces are indeed subjective. But already in his (1969b) paper, Quine had appealed to evolutionary theory in order to relate the subjective standards to objective regularities. Consequently, Quine's innate quality spaces indeed make it possible to specify a set of classes that reflect objective similarities. 

7. Conclusions
Quine refuses to include properties in his ontology because they have no clear principle of individuation. He therefore tries to give an account of the phenomena that are supposed to prove the existence of properties in terms of kinds and similarities. Quine admits, however, that there are problems with these two notions. I have therefore introduced the generalization framework GF which avoids these problems while remaining within the boundaries of Quine's austere ontology. Moreover, I have discussed a number of objections to Quine's program, and I have argued that they are invalid. In my arguments I have relied heavily on Quine's plausible conclusions about the psychological processes by which we acquire our language.

NOTES
1 See also Quine's comment on Kripke's (1971) use of possible worlds:
[Kripke] reassures us regarding his talk of possible worlds; it is not science fiction but only a vivid way of phrasing our old familiar contrary-to-fact conditionals…it is amusing to imagine that some of us same philosophers may be so bewildered by this further concept that we come to welcome the old familiar contrary-to-fact conditionals as a clarification (Quine, 1972, p. 492).

2 When discussing the reasons for introducing properties, Swoyer (1996) mentions that our ability to recognize and classify new and novel things "is said to be explained by the hypothesis that the things have a common property, e.g., redness or circularity, and that we have somehow learned to recognize it" (p. 247). The use of 'somehow' suggests that, presently, there seems to be no experimentally supported theory available that accounts for this ability. Notice also that the theory must account for the property-based generalizations which occur, for example, when a child ostensively learns to apply 'human' (or 'featherless-biped') to a class of "similar" entities after observing a number of examples. (Swoyer mentions such generalizations when stating that "it is argued that the possession of a common property (like redness), together with certain linguistic conventions, explains why general terms apply to just the things that they do" (p. 247).)
3 On the direct and indirect connection of non-ostensive terms to basic ostensive terms, see Carnap's discussion of the correspondence rules that connect observational terms with theoretical ones (1956, 1966, pp. 232-239). Quine speaks in this connection of a "fabric of sentences variously associated to one another and to nonverbal stimuli by the mechanism of conditioned response … a transitivity of conditioning" (1960, pp. 11-12). 
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